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GOODNESS AND HUMANNESS: DISTINGUISHING
TRAITS?
JAMES E. MOLITERNO*
At the ABA Professional Skills Conference in Albuquerque, New Mexico, I
observed evidence of a problem that seems endemic to skills teachers: a problem
that adversely affects our relationships with other faculty members, our place in
legal education, and indeed the quality of legal education that we jointly produce.'
The problem is indicated by the following questions: (1) what do we call ourselves
and how do we distinguish ourselves from the rest of the law school faculty?;
and (2) is it fair, true, or productive to distinguish ourselves as skills teachers
from the rest of the faculty based on an assertion of our supposed inherently
superior moral fabric?
From the beginning of the Conference to the end, distinctions were made
between skills teachers and everyone else on the law faculty. And, of course,
we must make such distinctions at times to facilitate thoughtful examination of
what we do. The distinctions were evidenced by our efforts at finding a name
for what we do and our efforts to define what we do as being different from
what other law faculty members do. Participants debated whether we teach
"skills" (regarded by some as demeaning),2 whether we teach "lawyering"
(regarded by some as too narrow),3 and whether other law teachers teach "skills."
Attempts were made to distinguish skills teachers from the rest of the faculty
by use of contrasting labels such as "skills teachers" versus "traditional teachers,"
"skills teachers" versus "nonskills teachers," "human teachers" (translation,
skills teachers) versus who-knows-what, and "good (both morally and techni-
cally) teachers" versus you-know-what-teachers. 4 None of these labels or dis-
tinctions work because none is based on the true (and I say insignificant) difference
between teachers who primarily teach skills and those who do not. Despite skills
teachers' emphasis on using different methodologies, I mean to suggest that there
*Assistant Professor and Director of the Legal Skills Program, College of William and Mary, Marshall-
Wythe School of Law, formerly of Texas Tech University School of Law where Professor Moliterno taught
a course entitled Comprehensive Skills Development, a simulation clinic.
I. This essay is not meant as a criticism of the Conference generally, as I found it to be full of good
ideas and thoughtful new approaches to teaching.
2. These people seemed to prefer "lawyering" as the label for what we teach. It is true, of course, that
we teach "skills" that are of an order different from those that might be taught in a welding or plumbing
class (two skills, by the way, that I very much wish I possessed but have no desire to teach). I know of
no skills teacher, for example, who teaches students how to balance their soon to be overstuffed checkbooks
or how to repair their own office equipment. The skills we teach are really modes of thinking. To call what
we teach "skills" is not to call the courses we teach "blowtorch law 101."
3. As Dean Kramer explained, "lawyering" may be too narrow a term for what we teach because many
of the skills we teach are equally useful to those of our students who choose to pursue careers in business,
politics, and other fields. These skills might conceivably even be useful to teachers.
4. For an interesting discussion of the difficulties inherent in label selection in the context of skills
teaching, see Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Education, 34 UCLA
L. REV. 577 (1987).
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is no true, all-purpose distinction between skills teachers5 and the rest of the
faculty. This Article is about the dangers in making the kinds of false, misguided
distinctions that were made by some at the Conference: the inherent dangers to
us and to them in "us-them" thinking.
I. DISTINCTIONS MADE BETWEEN SKILLS TEACHERS AND THE
REST OF THE FACULTY
Distinctions made between "traditional faculty" and "skills faculty" are un-
sound. The opposite of "traditional" is not "skills." Although a distinction might
be made between traditional6 teachers and innovative teachers, it is simply not
true to say that all skills teachers are more innovative than all other law teachers.
It takes little more than a glance at a handful of issues of the Journal of Legal
Education to see as much.7 The error of this distinction is also evidenced by the
number of substantive law faculty and administrators at the Conference:8 they
were not there spying on an enemy camp; they wanted to learn our methodologies
and innovations and to expand their own teaching. It is also possible (dare I say
this?) that skills teachers could learn some things about innovation from the rest
of the faculty, as well.
The second distinction made was between "skills teachers" versus "nonskills
teachers." This distinction can only be sound if it is understood as defining the
5. Although I argue that there is no substantive distinction worth making between so-called skills teachers
and the rest of the law faculty, for ease of reference I use the term "skills teacher" in this essay. I use it
to mean those whose teaching concentration is in clinical courses, trial advocacy, negotiations, writing,
and other courses commonly labeled as "skills offerings."
6. I do not use the word "traditional" here in the pejorative way that some at the Conference used it.
7. Each of these articles was written by someone who would not be called a skills teacher based on a
fair reading of the author's biographical sketch in the 1987-88 Directory of Law Teachers: Anderson &
Kirkwood, Teaching Civil Procedure With The Aid of Actual Local Tort Litigation, 37 J. OF LEGAL EDoUC.
215 (1987); Baier, What is the Use of a Law Book Without Pictures or Conversations? 34 J. OF LEGAL
EDuC. 619 (1984); Brown, Simulation Teaching: A Twenty-Second Semester Report, 34 J. OF LEGAL EDOUC.
638 (1984); Clark, The Rationale for Computer-Aided Instruction, 33 J. OF LEGAL EOUC. 459 (1983); Day,
Teaching Constitutional Law: Role Playing the Supreme Court, 36 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 268 (1986); Fry,
Simulating Dynamics: Using Role-Playing to Teach the Process of Bankruptcy Reorganization, 37 J. OF
LEGAL EDuc. 253 (1987); Herwitz, Teaching Skills in a Business Law Setting: A Course in Business
Lawyering. 37 J. OF LEGAL EOUC. 261 (1987); McAninch, Experiential Learning in a Traditional Class-
room, 36 J. OF LEGAL EouC. 420 (1986); Mudd, Beyond Rationalism: Performance-Referenced Legal
Education, 36 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 189 (1986); Ogden, The Problem Method in Legal Education, 34 J. OF
LEGAL EDUC. 654 (1984); Zarr, Learning Criminal Law Through the Whole Case Method, 34 J. OF LEGAL
EDUC. 697 (1984).
8. A review of the roster of Conferees combined with fair inferences drawn from a review of each
Conferee's biographical sketch in the 1986-87 Directory of Law Teachers indicates the following about the
Conferees:
Deans 22 (19%)
Skills teachers 66 (55%)
(concentration in skills teaching
or administration of skills
programs)
Other law faculty 22 (19%)
(exclusive or nearly exclusive
teaching of substantive law or
procedure)
Others (mostly practitioners) 8 (7%)
Interestingly, some 45 percent of the Conferees could not fairly be described as skills teachers.
[Vol. 19
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difference in focus of skills teachers versus all other law teachers. In truth, the
only difference between skills teachers and the rest of the faculty is in the subject
matter of course offerings and the implications to teaching methodology that go
along with that difference in subject matter. All law teachers teach skills. It
cannot be wrong to call us skills teachers provided it is understood that we are
being called skills teachers not because we are the only law teachers teaching
skills but because skills are the subject matter of the courses we teach. It is not
demeaning to acknowledge that we teach skills, as some at the Conference
suggested.9 The skills that skills teachers focus on teaching are no less demanding
or difficult to master than the skills that the rest of the faculty focus on teaching. 0
Because we all teach skills of one kind or another, we can only distinguish
so-called skills teachers from the rest of the faculty on the basis of the subject
matter and focus of the courses offered. When a contracts teacher does his or
her job, that teacher conveys, at a minimum, skills of case analysis, doctrinal
analysis, and statutory analysis. But the contracts teacher is teaching primarily
contracts and secondarily the lawyering skills that must be mastered by first year
law students." Skills teachers, on the other hand, have as the subject matter of
their courses the skills that are being taught. Thus, the skills taught by the
contracts teacher are secondary to the subject matter of the course but are taught
nonetheless. The skills teacher, however, teaches substantive law, where nec-
essary, secondarily to the subject matter of his or her course, the skills component.
Even those skills teachers who claim to be heavy on substance give skills teaching
higher priority in their courses. The heavy emphasis on substance is designed
primarily to make the skills learning more effective.
Because the subject matter of our courses is different from that of the contracts
or torts teacher, we use different methodologies and we need different teaching
skills ourselves to be successful teachers. But these fairly minor differences
should not be translated into an "us-them" mentality. (In fact, some of "us"
teach contracts or torts, and so on, in addition to our skills teaching, and are
therefore both "us" and "them,"-a truly frightening prospect.) Seen for what
they really are, the distinctions are not particularly illuminating or helpful. They
are only slightly more significant than the distinction between contracts teachers
and torts teachers-not a terribly profound or useful distinction for anyone but
conference organizers and book publishers' sales staff administering compli-
mentary copy policies.
Simply said, the only distinctions that should be made between so-called skills
teachers and other faculty members are those that have some basis in pedagogical
philosophy, methodology, and subject matter of the courses that we teach. To
my way of thinking, there should be no distinctions at all beyond those that are
9. See supra note 2.
10. "[Elnds-means thinking, information-acquisition analyses, contingency planning, comparative risk
evaluation in decisionmaking, and the like . . . [(the skills taught by so-called skills teachers) are] no less
conceptual or academically rigorous than case reading and doctrinal analysis." Amsterdam, Clinical Legal
Education-A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 612, 615 (1984).
1I. It might well be argued that the focus of a teacher of a first year, core curriculum course is equally
divided between thinking skills and substantive law. Certainly, though, teachers of upper level substantive
law courses most often focus on the substantive law and not on the skills incidentally conveyed.
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necessary for thoughtful discussion and analysis of what we do. All faculty
members are engaged in a joint enterprise called legal education; the fewer
distinctions made and drawn between us, the better.'2
II. THE DISTINCTION BASED ON GOODNESS
Of course, there are some distinctions that have a basis in pedagogical phi-
losophy and methodology choice and are, therefore, appropriate distinctions to
make because they facilitate thoughtful analysis of what we do. Indeed, because
I, for example, am not ready as was suggested by Professor Gifford, to "reclaim
the legacy of Langdell" for skills teachers,' 3 there will likely always be some
appropriate distinctions based on differing pedagogical philosophies and meth-
odology choices between most skills teachers and much of the rest of the law
faculty. What concerns me most is one particular distinction that I heard drawn
several times during the Conference, a distinction potentially most damaging
and harmful to legal education; the nature of the distinction is moral. It has as
its basis that we skills teachers are good people and, as a sometimes implicit
and sometimes explicit otherside, that all other faculty members are bad people. "
We simply should not be making distinctions that are so charged morally, po-
litically, and personally, and that have no basis in pedagogical philosophy. I
12. It may be said that this is easy for me to say. I am fortunate to have been associated with two
schools at which I have had a status that is no different from any other faculty member. I am regarded no
differently from any other faculty member: I have a specialty (skills teaching) just as any number of other
faculty members have a specialty. It may be more difficult for other skills teachers to escape the world of
making erroneous, unnecessary, and harmful distinctions when they are themselves distinguished from the
rest of the faculty at their own schools in many erroneous, unnecessary, and harmful ways. Advancement
of our common goals, however, will never occur while we are also making the kinds of erroneous,
unnecessary, and harmful distinctions discussed in this Article.
The story of this sort of hypocrisy is told well by Dr. Seuss in his story about the Sneetches, like beings
that could be distinguished from one another only by the presence or absence of a star on each Sneetch's
belly. T. SEuss GEISEL, THE SNEETCHES AND OTHER STORIES (1961). Of course, the group with the stars
latched onto this insignificant distinction as the identifying mark of the superior form of Sneetch. Once the
Plain-Bellied Sneetches acquired stars, however, the others lamented:
"Good grief!" groaned the ones who had stars at the first.
"We're still the best Sneetches and they are the worst.
But, now, how in the world will we know," they all frowned,
"If which kind is what, or the other way round?"
Id. at 13. Thereafter, both groups of Sneetches spent considerable time, energy, and money attempting to
reestablish the distinction by adding and removing their stars and alternately claiming superiority until no
Sneetch knew which group was which. Happily, once sufficiently confused about who was who, the
Sneetches were enlightened:
[The Sneetches got really quite smart on that day,
The day they decided that Sneetches are Sneetches
And no kind of Sneetch is the best on the beaches.
That day, all the Sneetches forgot about stars
And whether they had one, or not, upon thars.
id. at 24.
The sooner we all realize that law teachers are law teachers, the better we all will be.
13. See Professor Gifford's remarks from the initial panel discussion.
14. Admittedly, some would say that other faculty members are not bad, they are just not as good as
we skills teachers are. Interestingly, based upon conversations at the Conference, it appears that some live-
client clinicians would also draw this distinction between themselves and simulation skills teachers.
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heard such distinctions being made at the Conference, however, particularly
during the first day tone-setting remarks.
It would be one thing to say that, based on a difference in pedogogical phi-
losophy, all teachers that use methodologies different from skills teachers are
bad teachers, but it is quite another to imply that they are of an ilk of diminished
morality. The "bad teacher '" 5 claim would be false but would not be of the
same destructive order as the diminished morality charge. There is no place for
such a distinction in our field both because it is not true and because it is the
most harmful of distinctions we could make between skills teachers and other
faculty.
While I was warmed by the tone-setting remarks of the first day of the Con-
ference, the days have passed, it seems to me, when skills teachers need emo-
tional pep talks to continue doing high quality work. We need not be rallied to
a mission or convinced that what we do is bring goodness to legal education.
Of course a goal of skills teachers should be the exposure of students to matters
of the heart as well as matters of the mind, 6 but this goal is not ours exclusively.
We do not have a monopoly on goodness, humanness, and social conscience,
and we hurt ourselves and our students when we claim one.
The subject matter of our courses is not social conscience. It may well be that
our courses have a tendency to permit students so inclined to develop a social
conscience, but the subject matter of our courses is the skill of lawyering. We
are not, it seems to me, on the "front line" of a social movement as was intimated
by Justice Wahl and others. I am not suggesting that we should avoid instilling
in our students a sense of social conscience, any more than the Professional
Responsibility, Constitutional Law, or any other teacher should. The fact that
our offerings may lend themselves to permitting students to acquire a sense of
social conscience, however, must not be the premise that underlies our claim to
a full membership in the curriculum for our courses or on the faculty for ourselves.
Our irrational claim to moral superiority is on some level a reaction to our
history of being treated as second class faculty citizens. But it is too late in the
day for us to squander our valuable time and energy moaning about past poor
treatment. Instead of contributing to the move toward full membership on the
faculty for all skills teachers, the claim contains an implicit acknowledgment
that skills teachers remain on the fringe of legal education. (It sometimes seems
that we believe this more deeply than does the rest of the faculty.) Far from
indicating that we are a legitimate part of legal education, this claim divides us
from the rest of the faculty and detracts from efforts at integrating various teaching
methods into a coherent whole that might constitute legal education. We need
to act like (not always to be read "be like") full members of the faculty in order
to be full members of the faculty. By that I mean that we must be willing to
engage in self critique and promote our interests by argument that is based on
the value of what we do and not our perception of the dark hearts beating within
those who have views different from our own. Engaging in moral superiority
15. For one explanation of what it is like to be a "bad law teacher," see Tushnet, On Being A Bad Law
Teacher, Newsletter of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, May 1987, at 22.
16. See Justice Rosalee Wahl's remarks opening the Conference.
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rhetoric detracts from our claims to full faculty status. It is time to realize that
we have been accepted and live with that fact. 7
The separation that results from the moral superiority claim is different in kind
and quality from that which results from our legitimate pedogogical differences.
This claim is not likely to lead to constructive results but is more likely to result
in hostility and ruination of working relationships. It will pour cold water on
efforts at collaboration that we know are crucial to integration of skills into the
three year curriculum. We heard at the Conference of the successful efforts being
made in that regard at NYU, Montana, Connecticut, and elsewhere. These efforts
could not have begun, let alone have been successful, if one side or the other
had charged up to take some supposed moral highground. " The fact that we too
often resort to condemning those who use different methodologies from us instead
of constructing the many legitimate and, I think, irresistable arguments for skills
teaching based on its merits sends the most negative of messages about the value
of what we do.
By virtue of our sometimes claim to the exclusive possession of the ability to
convey humanness, ethics, and professionalism, and by setting ourselves up as
adversaries, we tend in that same degree to relieve the rest of the faculty of
responsibility in this regard. If we relieve this responsibility, how many students
are we as skills teachers affecting? How many students can we reach if we claim
to function as lone wolves on our respective faculties? "Our" students are not
only the students registered into our skills courses but are all the students of the
law school, and until each of us recognizes this simple truth we are not full
members of our faculties. By making our claims to being the exclusive purveyors
of goodness, humanness, and ethics and implicitly relieving the rest of the faculty
of responsibility in that regard, we in fact reduce the level of humanity to which
17. Dean Vorenberg, for example, identifies the following as among the directions in which legal
education is moving: Negotiation, ADR, Pro Se Clinics, Field Based Clinics, Simulation Courses. Vor-
enberg, Challenges to Legal Education, Harvard Gazette (Law School Supp.), April 24, 1987, at I. Who
will fill these slots but people who teach with methodologies similar to those now being used by skills
teachers?
The status of skills teachers is improving. Of the skills teachers present at the Conference, for example,
the following breakdown of faculty status is indicated:
Assistant Professor 8
Associate Professor 13
Professor l8
Visiting Professor I
Instructor or Lecturer 5
Other (usually Coordinator
or Director of a program) 21
18. As Professor Ruud has correctly pointed out:
[Ulnnecessary difficulties . . . have been created by those who have a good idea and
want to advocate it who make the case for their reform principally by condemning present
arrangements as terrible or worse instead of describing the special contributions to legal
education their suggested reform will make . . . . The process of establishing clinical
legal education as an important element of any program of sound legal education had
too much counterproductive rhetoric. Too often the advocates described the limitations
of conventional classroom teaching and attacked its practitioners. Too little attention
was given to the very important contribution that sound clinical programs can add to a
law student's education. The wrong rhetoric too often divided faculties into two camps.
Executive Director's Report, Newsletter of AALS No. 87-3, June 1987.
[Vol. 19
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our students are exposed; we lessen the breadth of values to which our students
might aspire; and we reduce the quality of the education that our students receive.
It may be true that we pour ourselves into our students as skills teachers, but
we harm our students by allowing the distinctions that we make to discourage
other faculty members from doing the same.
The goal of producing law graduates that have been exposed to humanness
and the importance of people to the law is one that must be shared by all of the
law faculty. Professor Lesnick's criticism of legal education, for example, is not
directed at one kind of law teacher or another but at legal education itself. 9 Our
legitimate concerns about the lack of humanness that may be perceived in legal
education must likewise be directed at all faculty and not only at those who
teach subjects different from those that we teach. It is tempting, of course, to
point fingers at all others, but an important part of being an academic is self-
critique.2' If one of our concerns is a lack of humanness in legal education, then
we do nothing to enhance humanness and everything to diminish it by claiming
to be unique on the faculty in fostering humanness in our students.
The responsibility for conveying ethics and professionalism falls upon the law
school generally.2" Of course, our offerings are excellent vehicles for conveying
ethics and professionalism, but our offerings accomplish many other goals as
well; it is counterproductive to attempt to claim to be the exclusive conveyors
of ethics and professionalism because we cannot do this job alone. We cannot
be effective in promoting these attributes by setting them up as the sole or primary
reason for our own existence. Our charge is broader than this and at the same
time does not include the exclusive responsibility for conveying these desirable
attributes. Our students cannot afford to have us make claims that tend to reduce
the rest of the faculty's responsibility in this area.
The responsibility of responding to developing notions of what processes
produce the most justice is also a joint undertaking shared by the whole faculty.
Although it is certainly true that skills teachers have responded by teaching more
and more skills essential to effective alternative dispute resolution practice, for
example (and of course this is part of our legacy and our responsibility to legal
education),22 so has much of the rest of the faculty.' The faculty should not be
encouraged by our false moral claim to look to us to fulfill the teaching profes-
sion's full responsibility for responding to such changes.
19. Lesnick, Legal Education's Concern with Justice: A Conversation with a Critic, 35 J. OF LEGAL
EDUC. 414 (1985).
20. See Condlin, "Tastes Great, Less Filling": The Law School Clinic and Political Critique, 36 J. OF
LEGAL EDUC. 45, 60 (1986) (suggesting that indeed a failing of skills teachers has been their ability or
willingness to engage in self-critique).
21. Ethics in Academia: Power and Responsibility in Legal Education, 34 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 155
(1984).
22. Condlin, supra note 20.
23. See, e.g., Carrington, Civil Procedure and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 34 J. OF LEGAL EDuc.
298 (1984); Galanter, Worlds of Deals Using Negotiation to Teach about Legal Process, 34 J. OF LEGAL
EDUC. 268 (1984); Green, A Comprehensive Approach to the Theory and Practice of Dispute Resolution,
34 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 245 (1984); Minow, Some Thoughts on Dispute Resolution and Civil Procedure,
34 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 284 (1984); Moberly, A Pedogogy for Negotiation, 34 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 315(1984); Sacks, Legal Education and the Changing Role of Lawyers in Dispute Resolution, 34 J. OF LEGAL
EDUC. 237 (1984).
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To the extent that we must draw distinctions between skills teachers and the
rest of the faculty for purposes of thoughtful discussion of what we do, those
distinctions should have their basis in differences of pedagogical philosophy and
methodology choice. They should not be distinctions based on the relative moral
worth of one segment of the faculty or of that segment's contribution to legal
education. Given that the real distinctions worth discussing are those of subject
matter focus and methodology, our time might be better spent distinguishing not
persons from persons but teaching focus from teaching focus or methodology
from methodology. This would allow us to stop using labels such as "skills
teacher" altogether in favor of labels that identify the various functions we
perform and methodologies we use instead of the person performing the function
or using the methodology. Needlessly distinguishing ourselves from the rest of
the faculty does nothing to serve the purposes of thoughtful discourse; it does
everything to detract from the goal of all faculty members to provide the best
possible legal education available to our students and thereby produce the best
possible lawyers to serve the society.
